Cost of Conflict and Conflict Prevention in the Middle East
Keynotes by Ambassador Thomas Greminger, Antalya 16.3.2007
(Introduction)
Dear Ladies and Gentlemen
- First of all let me thank the Strategic Foresight Group and our Turkish host for making this possible. It is a privilege for my country to cooperate with these partners.
- It is a great honour to speak at this distinguished forum and to share some thoughts with you. At the same time it is a daunting challenge for me: Having a keynote speech on Conflict Prevention in the Middle East is rather a ‘mission impossible’. The Middle East conflicts persist for more than fifty years. Everything has been tried: Military solutions, bilateral diplomacy, mediation by third parties, by the UN, by other multilateral institutions, partition plans, shuttle diplomacy, confidence building, step-by-step approaches, all-at-once plans, road maps, approaches on track one, track two and track three, by governments as well as by non-governmental organisations and basically all initiatives have failed so far.
- Against this background I will not try to present you a solution, but I'd like to share with you a few ideas, in which direction further explorations could make sense and I hope we can deepen some of these paths during the day.
- I will start with (1st) three examples of Swiss initiatives to resolve conflicts in the Middle East. None of them has reached its ultimate goal, but this allows me (2nd) to draw some lessons out of their failures and to elaborate why the cost of conflict approach could be a promising path. I will then (3rd) share with you some general ideas on prevention before (4th) concluding with some personal remarks.
(1. Swiss experiences: Geneva Initiative, Syria-Israel, Hudna)
Preliminary remark
- Switzerland is not a track one actor on peace mediation in the Middle East. Being a small country we can only develop ideas and explore innovative paths which might bring new inputs to a solution of this conflict. It then depends on the conflicting parties or on the members of the Middle East Quartet to take them up.
Geneva Initiative
- In the Geneva Initiative, which was made public in autumn 2003, Switzerland acted as facilitator between the high level exponents of the civil society of both parties in conflict.
- The Geneva Accord offers pragmatic solutions to all major points of contention, respecting the vital aspirations for security and self-determination of both the Israeli and Palestinians. Never before was the vision of a viable Two-State solution better epitomized and within palpable reach. Indeed, no taboo was left untouched – neither the status of Jerusalem, nor the right of return.
- The Initiative gathered impressing support amongst the population of both, Israel and Palestine and amongst the international community. Not surprisingly it also met sharp criticism from both sides. Owing to the fact that both populations have not been prepared by their respective governments of the necessary arduous concessions a peace agreement will ultimately and unavoidably require, it was a relatively easy task for the radicals to pigeonhole the courageous architects of the Geneva Accord as Pétainists and defeatists.
- The Geneva Initiative has not yielded a peace agreement. But it sparked international debate about the then-popular ‘no-partner’ mantra and probably contributed to Israel's unilateral disengagement from the Gaza strip. But most importantly: The Geneva Accord remains the sole comprehensive blueprint for a final status agreement that takes into account all the sensitive issues of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and has thus become a major reference document. This is certainly an achievement.
Syria-Israel (Golan)
- A second Swiss initiative was the facilitation of confidential talks between Syrian and Israeli representatives on a settlement of the Golan status and on a general peace agreement.
- Switzerland was asked in June 2004 by a former Israeli government official to host and facilitate unofficial track 2 talks between Syria and Israel. Participants were former officials and chief negotiators as well as representatives of independent think-tanks. A small number of important figures of both governments were kept informed about the progress of these discussions.
- A blueprint of a comprehensive Israeli-Syrian peace accord as well as the possibility of different CBMs were elaborated and proposed during these talks.
- After two years one of the governments insisted that discussions should start on the official echelon. Because the other government was not ready for such a step, some of the participants of this back-channel leaked the information on January 2007 to the press, thus hoping to spark broad discussion and to put public pressure on the two governments.
- Evidently, after the press leakage the back-channel was discredited and futile.
Hamas-Israel (Hudna)
- This brings me to the third example, which entails the discussion we had with representatives from Hamas in order to achieve a long-term cease-fire or Hudna.
- The elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council of January 2006 were free and fair. Even the UN Security Council congratulated the Palestinian people on this democratic achievement. Because of this democratic legitimacy, Switzerland was ready to engage in a low-level dialogue with Hamas representatives. Generally we believe that it is wrong to refuse dialogue with such movements, even if they use unacceptable means. Isolation hardly ever works; it usually tends to strengthen the radicals and to silence the more moderate voices.
- Hamas is a part of both the Palestinian political landscape and, as a branch of the Muslim brotherhood, of the political reality of the Sunni Arab World. Hamas will not vanish any time soon; it is there to stay, and the Brotherhood is a steadily growing force, if we like it or not.
- With this in our mind, Switzerland in Summer 2006, started discussions with Hamas representatives about a long-term cease-fire or Hudna. In this specific case, we stressed from the beginning that public statements about this process would be a No-Go. Furthermore, both the Israeli government and the Palestinian presidency were kept discreetly informed.
- While the Hamas participants kept their word in fully respecting the confidentiality of the process and of the document, the latter was leaked to the press by an official of one of the governments kept informed.
- Again, it is not easy to draw conclusions from this exercise. Talks about the necessity of a cease-fire between Hamas and Israel have just recently gained momentum, in a way demonstrating that our efforts - while not mainstream at the time - were based on a sound analysis.
(2. Lessons learned and future ideas:
Why Cost of Conflict could be a valuable approach)
- What the three initiatives had in common: They brought fresh ideas and showed innovative ways to solve some the underlying causes of the conflicts. There is a plan for a compromise on most of the controversial issues. And I am pretty sure, that future solutions will take much of the substance laid down in the text of the Geneva Initiative or of the Syria-Israel peace accord blueprint.
- At the same time, all three diplomatic initiatives did not reach their ultimate goal, because at least one of the parties in conflict was not fully committed or interested. Obviously it was relatively easy to destroy them, for instance, by leaking to the press.
- Neither the conflict parties nor the Middle East Quartet have been willing to take these ideas up seriously. For the future it is clear, that we need new specific initiatives to resolve conflict issues, the Annapolis process may be one. But we definitely need new broader approaches, new avenues which may gather broad support. One of them could be the cost of conflict approach.
- What does the ‘mother of all conflicts’ really cost us? We do not know it. But I am definitely intrigued by the methodology used by the Strategic Foresight Group in other contexts.
- On India and Pakistan: For the first time in the 57 years of hostility between India and Pakistan a comprehensive assessment of the cost of conflict between the two countries has been made by Strategic Foresight Group in its 2004 report. The cost of conflict between India and Pakistan, takes into account comprehensive economic costs, socio-political damage, military costs, diplomatic costs, human costs and even the implications of the nuking of Mumbai and Karachi. The report has also estimated Gross Terror-economy Product (GTP) of Kashmir and Pakistan and likely financial and human costs that the two countries will incur in the next five years. The figures speak for themselves:
- India and Pakistan will lose about 1,500 soldiers in the next five years in Siachen conflict alone without fighting a war.
- Pakistan’s military expenses are 3.8% of its GDP, the same amount as spent for development. The figure is only slightly better for India (2,7%). Pakistan and India have poverty rates of 32% and 26.1% respectively, the literacy rate being 51.6% and 65.4%.
- Pakistan's Conflict Economy is more than 10 per cent of GDP.
- India and Pakistan have the potential to enjoy a trade of about $1 billion if hostile environment continues and $13.25 billion if peace prevails on a cumulative basis for the next five years (2004-08) resulting in an opportunity loss of $12 billion.
- The Cost of Conflict in Sri Lanka Report, published in January 2006, uses the same creative analytical tools developed by the Strategic Foresight Group to assess the impact of conflict on different sections of Sri Lankan economy and society as well as its comprehensive impact on the future of the nation. It studies not only the direct costs of conflict such as human deaths, increased military expenditure, or economic losses in the form of lowered foreign direct investment or losses in tourism. But, it also studies the effects of a two decade plus conflict in promoting societal corrosion and segregation, political polarization and extremism and regional disparity. Its findings are impressive:
- The twenty-five year long military conflict between the Tamil insurgents and successive Sri Lankan governments has made Sri Lanka the most militarised country in South Asia. In this respect, Sri Lanka has dwarfed the much larger India and military-ruled Pakistan.
- In 2004, Sri Lanka was the most militarised among the South Asian countries with 8,000 military personnel per one million population.
- In terms of military expenditure as percentage of GDP also, Sri Lanka spent the most. Sri Lanka's defence expenditure is also higher than other comparable conflict-ridden countries such as Colombia, Myanmar, Sierra Leone, Sudan, the Philippines and Uganda.
- LTTE's annual expenditure is estimated anywhere between $175 million and $385 million. The LTTE spends a minimum on its cadres and the maximum on sustaining a war economy and its support base internationally. It is believed that the total income comes from drug trafficking, local taxation and extortion, human smuggling and funds siphon off from NGOs, contributions from the Tamil expatriate community and profits from businesses.
- The report quantifies several indirect costs of the conflict in Sri Lanka's North and East: There are an estimated 47,000 war widows, 40% of all
primary teachers posts are vacant, 1.8 million land mines are still not cleared.
- Even more recently, researchers at the Geneva based Small Arms Survey have suggested to extend the optic from a narrower focus on the costs of armed conflict to a broader treatment of what they call ‘the burden of armed violence’. They argue that, accounting for both conflict and non-conflict related armed violence would readjust our understanding of the existing patterns of armed violence. It would also help to establish a more complete picture on the opportunities for preventive diplomacy deriving to the costs of armed violence.
- The burden of armed violence is conceptualised in relation to its human, economic and mobilisation costs. The human costs refer to direct and indirect conflict-related mortality as well as intentional non-conflict deaths. The economic costs include the real and relative impacts of armed violence on household productivity, savings, investment and state-level expenditures on social and welfare services. Mobilisation costs pertain to the funds required to mobilise and sustain various forms of armed violence. Identifying the multiple costs of armed violence can highlight tangible and concrete possibilities for preventive diplomacy. No matter what concept you choose – the cost of conflict or the burden of armed violence – the result will be impressive by the enormity of the costs evidenced. We believe it is possible to measure and assess these costs, even though much needs to be done in order to provide more precise and tangible data.
- A nuanced approach to measuring armed violence or cost of conflict can help shape negotiation strategies and policy debates, signal the costs and benefits of preventive action, and define policy to prevent and reduce armed violence. Cost estimates also allow policy makers to better prioritise interventions and allocate resources before, during and after conflict breaks out.
(3. Conflict Prevention in General)
- This makes clear that both the burden of armed violence and the cost of conflict are only a part of a broader approach towards conflict prevention in general.
- In his progress report of 2006 the then Secretary General of the UN Kofi Annan has called to invest at least 2% of global peacebuilding activities in conflict prevention. We are still far away from that modest target.
- The direct costs of each of the 56 ongoing violent conflicts around the globe are estimated at $ 64 billion per conflict. A comprehensive package of conflict preventions measures ranges between 10 and 30% of this costs. Effective early prevention would also reduce or entirely eliminate the $250 billion in indirect costs of these conflicts and save bordering countries form coping with mass migration, destabilized borders, reduced trade and increasing organized crime.
- The conclusion is obvious: We need new mechanisms to deal with conflicts in a new way. For instance we should invest a lot more into building a new infrastructure of conflict prevention, be it on national levels (e.g. in Kenya), on a regional approach (e.g. within the African Union) or globally.
- But first of all we definitely need to create more awareness for the importance of conflict prevention. And this is a major strength of the cost of conflict or burden of armed violence approach.
- Let me mention here one other initiative of conflict prevention where we are involved and which could inspire broader action:
- The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development process: We are all aware that conflicts are a major reason for insufficient development. A number of studies have shown that the majority of countries in which armed conflicts are being carried out or have recently been carried out are to be found near the bottom of the Human Development Index. If these states want to secure sustainable development for their population, they must do everything in their power to prevent the use of armed violence. In collaboration with UNDP, Switzerland organised a ministers’ summit on 7 June 2006 which was attended officials from 42 countries. All participating states adopted the Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, thereby entering into a commitment to reduce the devastating effects of armed violence on socio-economic and human development. It is now the responsibility of these states to implement the Geneva Declaration. Meanwhile over 70 states have signed the Geneva Declaration and more are to do so. More important than the process is its result: We will further develop the methodology of measuring the impact of armed violence on development on regional, sub-regional and national level. This allows us to set benchmarks and to develop well calibrated and targeted actions against armed violence.
- At the ministerial review summit on 12 September we will publish a report on the ‘global burden of armed violence’ and outline how we envisage developing global security and development goals. We also plan to bring the issue of armed violence and development to the UN through a GA resolution.
(4. Conclusion)
Ladies and Gentlemen,
- Let me conclude with some personal convictions: There are many ways that smaller countries, academic institutions, non-governmental organisations or even well placed individuals can contribute to the prevention and to the resolution of armed conflicts. Sometimes even a simple, but innovative idea can bring new dynamics to old conflict patterns.
- But one thing is evident: Lonely riders rarely reach their goals. Peace is usually a teamwork - in very heterogeneous teams - , where each player knows its comparative advantages and is ready to collaborate with the others.
- I am sure that the concept of cost of conflict or the burden of armed violence gives us enough food for thought to come to some inspiring new approaches of conflict prevention.
- In this respect I am looking forward to a fruitful exchange of ideas today. I thank for your attention.
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