On June 29 last when India and the US signed a 10 year Defence Pact General Musharraf was busy responding to email questions addressed to him on his official website �€“ www.presidentofpakistan.gov.pk.

On that day Pakistan�€™s �€˜national interests�€™ were being defined rather differently. It was in �€˜national interest�€™ the General said in his email conversation to slap a ban on Mukhtaran Mai traveling abroad, �€œBecause her foreign travels would have tarnished Pakistan�€™s international image rather than help improve the lot of women in the country�€.

So the prime space on front pages of the national newspapers the next day was occupied by the General�€™s perception of �€˜national interest�€™ together with pictures of Mukhtaran Mai. No wonder that the reports of India and the US signing a 10-year Defence Pact were relegated either to back page or given less prominent space on front pages. Thereafter it was another day and Indo-US Defence Pact receded from public memory and forgotten.

Many in Pakistan seemed to harbor the illusion that the status of non-NATO ally to Pakistan or the billions pouring in aid, the restructuring of loans, or the flattering �€˜Musharraf my best friend�€™, and the joining of hands in the war on terror were elements of a long term strategic relationship between Washington and Islamabad. But considering the essential elements of the pact those illusions must be put to rest. It is not to say that a strategic relationship with the US is what Pakistan must seek. The point to emphasise is that we should not delude ourselves with misplaced notions of national security based on an assumed strategic relationship with the US.

Three critical elements in the Indo-US Defence Pact stand out and pose a grave challenge to Pakistan�€™s strategic interests, the foremost being the cooperation in the field of missile defence. Clearly, India acquiring missile defense system would strike at the heart of the theory of �€˜nuclear deterrence in South Asia�€™ so dear to our security experts. With capability to defend itself against incoming nuclear armed missiles where will be the nuclear parity and the deterrence against India?

With the existing nuclear deterrence made unstable by the missile defence system, Islamabad would naturally be tempted to upgrade the deterrence. An imbalance in conventional capability had lowered the nuclear threshold and to avoid a nuclear war it was important that Pakistan also improved its conventional deterrence, so was the argument.

Soon after 9/11 General Musharraf justifying his U-turn on Pakistan�€™s policies vis-à-vis Afghanistan, the jihad and Kashmir had said that it was done to protect the nation�€™s strategic assets. Strategic nuclear weapons seem to have become an albatross. To protect it Islamabad first reversed foreign policy goals and now to reduce the incentive for their use we seek deterrence in conventional weaponry as well. This is not to talk of being caught at a crossroads of international nuclear black market.

The second element of the pact is the joint India-US military production including transfer of technology. Pakistan�€™s military hardware of US origin is believed to be several years old. The manufacture of state of the art equipment and weapons across the border would gravely undermine efficacy of Pakistan�€™s weapons systems. Serious questions will be asked whether we should go for F-16s knowing that India might undertake co-production with the US much more advanced versions of the nuclear capable fighter aircrafts.

The third crucial element that threatens to increase instability in the region is making India a partner in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). The PSI is a dangerous concept, a product of post 9/11 that allows a member country to intercept international flights and ships if it suspects that such traffic is promoting nuclear proliferation. Significantly, interference with international air and sea traffic on suspicion of WMD movement is not under UN or multilateral arrangement but unilateral. The implications of India being made part of the PSI initiative should therefore not be underestimated for a country like Pakistan already accused of being at the centre of international nuclear black market.

It is yet to be seen whether India would buy the US bait. Many India analysts argue that the US offer is designed to make India a mere camp follower of Washington and that it must be rejected. That may be so and India may not readily accept the offer. But the fact remains that after the break up of Soviet Union and after 9/11 the traditional basis of interstate relations and principles of balance of power are fast collapsing and centres of gravity shifting to new locations.

The least our security experts should do is to make an honest re-evaluation of the cost of an Indo-Pak conflict in the event of India becoming a strategic partner of the US. In this context the report titled �€œCost of Conflict between India and Pakistan�€ launched by the Strategic Foresight Group (SFG) early last year may be of some help. �€œIf troops are mobilised again in future on the pattern of 2002 it will cost India 0.46 % of GDP and Pakistan 2.25% of GDP�€, it says graphically illustrating the cost of conflict for Pakistan. It has been estimated that if Pakistan had spent roughly the same proportion of GDP on military as in India the net saving to it would have been nearly three percent of the GDP. The amount if invested in economy and human development would have changed the country�€™s fate.

India becoming US�€™s strategic partner throws up new challenges. We may respond either by raising the level of �€˜minimum conventional and nuclear deterrence�€™ or by seeking to resolve conflicts so as to reduce military spending and pave the way for greater foreign investment and increased intra regional trade that will improve the lives of 150 million people of Pakistan. A national debate on how to meet the challenge would be in national interest.

The writer, a PPP Senator, is a member of the Senate Committee on Defence.